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It is always a risky business to attempt to say just what Plato's final 
pronouncement might be on one or another of the various doctrines that 
are presented throughout the course of the Dialogues. The same topic 
may be addressed from different angles at various points in the Corpus, 
and the contingencies of one discussion may require the emphasis of a 
particular point that is only just mentioned, or neglected altogether, in 
another. The difficulties are multiplied, of course, when the doctrine to be 
considered is as complicated and slippery as the question of human 
knowledge. We have just heard an attempt to say what Plato's theory of 
knowledge is. The various elements in this "Combined Theory" are 
brought together from various points in the Dialogues for the purpose of 
resolving some paradoxes that emerge in the Theaetetus. My comments 
here will be directed towards two separate but related issues. I begin with 
the question as to whether the Combined Theory as presented is 
consistent with what Plato has to say concerning knowledge and education 
at a point that I believe to be of some relevance to our reader's thesis, 
namely, Book VII of the Republic, and propose then to examine whether 
the Theory is able to do the work its author intends for it. 
The Combined Theory is centered around two claims, first, that we 
acquire knowledge of the forms through recollection by use of our senses, 
and second, that only with such knowledge are we able to know cognized 
external objects. In Book VII of the Republic, Socrates is discussing with 
Claucon the sort of education that would be appropriate for the guardians 
of the state. If we take the first claim of the Combined Theory to mean 
that our approach to knowledge of the forms begins with perception, we 
must bear in mind a distinction that Socrates draws in his discussion with 
Claucon between perceptions which "invite the intellect to reflection" and 
those which do not. (523b4). "Some reports of our perceptions," we read, 
"do not provoke thought...because the judgment of them by sensation 
seems adequate." An example of this sort of perception would be our 
consideration of the fingers of our own hand: we see the finger and 
observe forthwith that it is, indeed, a finger. The experiences that Socrates 
calls "provocatives," on the other hand, occur when "the perception no 
more manifests one thing than its contrary." Examples here include such 
things as bigness and smallness, hardness and softness and the like. 
When we look at a finger, to make the two examples clear, there is no 
doubt that it is a finger, but the same finger may appear large when 
compared to a child's, or small when compared to someone whose hand is 
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larger than our own; the same finger appears hard when we use it to 
perforate the seal on some package, and soft when we bump it against 
some sharp object. There is no largeness or smallness to be seen in the 
finger itself, no hardness or softness. The specific instance of such 
provocatives that Socrates wants to consider is the contradictory pair, 
one/many. In this case, when we look at some object, as Claucon is 
induced to say, "we see the same thing at once as one and as an indefinite 
plurality" (525a). This contradiction which arises from perception leads 
the mind on to the consideration of unity and plurality in themselves, and 
is the experiential basis for the study of arithmetic. Because this branch of 
study "compels the soul to employ pure thought with a view to truth itself 
(526b), it is held to be a subject that must be included in the curriculum 
under which the prospective guardians of the state are to be trained. 
We may fairly grant, at this point, that there is nothing in these 
passages which directly conflicts with the claim of the Combined Theory 
that knowledge of the forms begins with perception. The significance of 
this distinction between perceptions which are provocative of thought and 
those which are not will only be seen if we recall a few details of the 
manner in which our knowledge of the forms contributes to knowledge of 
external objects as this is elaborated under the terms of the Combined 
Theory. The machinery of knowledge seems to work something like this: 
We begin with perception and move upwards by a process of recollection 
to a knowledge of the forms. This knowledge of the forms is a necessary 
condition for such other cognitive functions as reflection and comparison, 
which latter functions permit the soul to grasp the ousia of a given object. 
I'll quote the specific passages from Ms. Laidlaw-Johnson's paper: 
...prior knowledge (of forms) allows one to produce the additional 
mental activity of comparison to transform data into an external 
object. The mind, through its awareness of the ousia of the external 
object, combines this single datum of the object with other data of the 
same object into the cognition of the external object.... The perceiver's 
awareness of the ousia of the external object—that it is a complex of 
data transformed into an external object via the comparative use of 
the forms-transforms the possession of infallible perceptions into 
knowledge of the external object, (p. 160) 
Knowledge of the forms, then, provides for the possibility of the mind's 
grasping ousia. Ousia, in turn, provides the ground upon which the diverse 
data of perception can be fused into a single, integral whole. This 
integrated fusion of the particulars of perception with the more abstract 
ousia gives us knowledge of the external object. 
As I indicated a moment ago, I quite agree that our progress towards 
knowledge of the forms must begin with perception, but we must here take 
stock of the sort of perception from which this knowledge begins. Only 
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those perceptions which manifest the peculiar form of contradiction 
adduced above are capable of initiating the mind's ascent towards 
knowledge of the forms. When we ask the further question of how such 
knowledge figures into our apprehension of the objects of sense, we must 
bear in mind the two types of perception that are available to the mind. 
We have, on the one hand, those perceptions of which the judgments of 
sensations are adequate on their own terms. On the other hand, we have 
the contradictory perceptions which we should not expect ever to 
relinquish their contradictory nature. Under the Combined Theory, we 
make use of our knowledge of the forms by returning to the data of 
perception, where they facilitate a process of synthesis and thereby give us 
knowledge of what had previously been nothing more than a collection of 
discrete perceptions. It's this last move that worries me. The clear thrust 
of the discussion in Book VII is that the prospective guardians must be 
encouraged to pursue the various studies that Socrates lists, arithmetic, 
geometry, astronomy and so forth, not solely for the sake of what utility 
they may have with regard to understanding the world, but rather, and 
more importantly, for the sake of leading the souls of these students 
towards a contemplation of the forms themselves. Socrates says at one 
point (talking of geometry), that "in fact the real object of the entire study 
is pure knowledge." This phrasing leaves open the possibility, of course, 
that there is some other sort of knowledge besides this "pure" sort, but he 
goes on to deny that the matter of sense perception can ever really be an 
object of learning. He says, 
..if anyone tries to learn about the things of sense, whether gaping up 
or blinking down, I would never say that he really learns—for nothing 
of the kind admits of true knowlcdge-nor would 1 say that his soul 
looks up, but down, even though he study floating on his back on sea 
or land. (529b-c) 
This claim must be weighed, of course, against the earlier claim which 
Socrates makes, that arithmetic, geometry, and so on, have an important 
practical application for the guardians, especially in connection with 
military planning. It seems quite clear, however, that Socrates is here 
denying that there is any real question of knowledge where the things of 
sense are concerned. 
A further point is worth mentioning here, in connection with Ms. 
Laidlaw-Johnson's interpretation of the nature of the learning process. 
We read (p. 157) that "the doctrine of the Republic (Book VI) |is| 
compatible with the doctrine in Phaedo." This pertains to the doctrine that 
knowledge of the forms comes through a process of recollection, a doctrine 
presented in the Meno as well. Book VII, however, suggests that 
recollection is not perhaps the only such means of access to the forms. 
Socrates says there, concerning the subjects to be studied by the 
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guardians, that "if these studies go far enough to bring out their 
community and kinship with one another, and to infer their affinities, then 
to busy ourselves with them contributes to our desired end, and the labor 
taken is not lost, but otherwise it is vain" (531c-d). This passage docs not 
explicitly confute the doctrine of recollection, of course. I mention it more 
for the sake of showing how difficult it is to establish any one doctrine 
concerning knowledge of the forms as the one correct version. 
I turn now to a consideration of Ms. Laidlaw-Johnson's attempt to 
resolve the paradoxes which appear in the Theaetetus. For the sake of 
brevity, I'll limit my remarks to the first of the paradoxes, which arises from 
the conflict between two implicit claims made by Socrates, that, on the one 
hand, knowledge can be acquired through teaching, and on the other, that 
knowledge can only be had through direct perception. It occurs to me that 
the question of knowledge as it bears on the fact of a given case of robbery 
needn't involve us in a discussion of how we might achieve knowledge of 
the forms. I say this for two reasons. First, if we take seriously the claim in 
Book VII of the Republic that we can never really speak of our having 
knowledge of the things of sense, but that our "judgments of sense" are 
somehow adequate on their own terms, then it seems plausible to suggest 
that the best we can hope for in establishing the facts of the case is that the 
jurors be convinced one way or another. If they are "judging without 
knowledge," it is not simply because of the constraints of time in the 
courtroom that they fail to attain such knowledge, but rather because 
knowledge of perceptual events is not to be expected in any case. This 
leaves us, of course, with the difficult assertion that the facts of the case 
can be known to an eyewitness. What can be "known" to the eyewitness 
should be appraised on the basis of whatever standards are appropriate to 
our "judgments of sense," a standard which it is not clear, given the claims 
from Book VII, need involve us in the question of the relation of the forms 
to perception. 
Second, in resolving the paradox by restating the two apparently 
conflicting claims as 1) knowledge of forms is acquired partially through 
teaching and 2) the acquisition of all knowledge requires perception, we 
might expect that , absent the constraints of time in the courtroom, our 
jurors might indeed be brought to knowledge of the events in question, in 
which case they could "judge with knowledge" instead of without it. But in 
the very nature of the case where we are speaking of events to which we 
were not an eyewitness, it seems unlikely that we should ever attain the 
sort of awareness we have of things before our eyes. Again, the best we can 
hope for is a relatively high assurance of what actually happened. It would 
seem a more plausible approach to resolving the apparent paradox to 
point out that Socrates has simply equivocated on the crucial term 
"knowledge," confusing the sense in which we have knowledge of the forms 
("pure knowledge"), knowledge of sensory objects (involving the rather 
different "judgments of sense"), and the knowledge we might reasonably 
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expect to have of a past event (a different problem altogether). One's 
preference for this approach would depend, of course, upon the extent to 
which one cares to incorporate the claims of Book VII into one's account of 
knowledge. My point in suggesting such an alternative is intended not so 
much to refute our reader's attempt to resolve the paradox by the 
methods she has chosen, but only to show that the further claim, that this 
approach can give us a completely consistent and final statement of 
Plato's theory of knowledge, is problematic at best. 
One further remark by way of summing up. At the very outset of her 
paper, Ms. Laidlaw-Johnson raises the question, "just what is Plato's 
project" in the Theaetetus? Her response to that question seems to be that 
he is working his way towards some concise formulation of a theory of 
knowledge, a theory which emerges only when we look to his various 
pronouncements in other Dialogues. The task she has taken upon herself 
is to try to bring these dispersed elements together into a definitive whole. 
Though I am skeptical of her results, I must nonetheless admire the 
elegance and force of her argument. For my part, I wonder whether such a 
definitive theory could ever be elaborated, given both the complexity of 
the issue and the wide range of comments that we find throughout the 
Corpus. We find certain passages, as I have tried to point out in the 
foregoing comments, that just cannot be completely harmonized with one 
another, and whatever theory we might hope to establish as Plato's final 
thought on the matter will always require us to pick and choose which 
passages are to be given preference, and which are to be excluded. As I 
read the Theaetetus, what Plato seems to be telling us is just that no such 
complete and concise theory of knowledge should be expected, in spite of 
the fact that we claim to have knowledge of this or that, that we use the 
word "knowledge" without any reservations concerning our correct use of 
the term. At one point in the discussion, Socrates says to Theaetetus that 
their whole discussion was blemished by a "vicious taint" (196e2). 'Times 
out of number," he continues, "we have said 'we know,' 'we do not know,' 
'we have knowledge,' 'we have no knowledge,' as if we could understand 
each other while we still know nothing about knowledge." The point of the 
Dialogue, it seems to me, is that we simply cannot say what knowledge is: 
hence the refutations which follow in quick order as the discussion unfolds. 
Which is not to say that the question, "What is knowledge?" is useless or 
futile. The Dialogue itself is a demonstration that knowledge consists in its 
pursuit, and that we have made an important gain even if we achieve no 
more than a recognition that we remain ignorant on the central point of 
our discussion. It is only by engaging in the exercise of such discussions 
that we attain to such a realization, and thereby take upon ourselves the 
modesty which comes of knowing that we do not know. To instill in us the 
"good sense not to fancy we know what we do not," is all that Socrates 
claims his art is capable of achieving. We should perhaps take him at his 
word. 
